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Institutions, opportunism and prosocial behavior: Some 
experimental evidence 
Antonio Cabrales, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González and Praveen Kujal 
 
Abstract: Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect 
against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions 
are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for 
different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent 
impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the 
possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust 
game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) 
choice of institutions. Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for 
institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand 
lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can 
benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for 
them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can 
choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is 
lower than in their absence. 
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1. Introduction 
Humans invest in social relationships in the hope of future gains in the social or economic 
domain, but due to their very nature such interactions implicitly rely on trust. That is, future 
benefits clearly depend on others’ behavior. Trust relations of these kinds form the 
foundation of social and economic interactions. To quote Arrow (1972, p.357): “Virtually 
every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction 
conducted over a certain period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic 
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence”. 
How this “mutual lack of confidence” negatively impacts economic transactions is 
illustrated with the following example. Suppose that an investor may trust an investee hoping 
that a later action by her may make the investment profitable. The investee can default (on 
her action) thus making the investment unprofitable. This possibility could induce the 
investor not to invest, thus harming both parties. To avoid the risk of default, some costly 
action can be put in place. Society has responded by developing institutions precisely to 
prevent this type of opportunistic behavior and minimize the loss of profitable exchanges. 
Certifying agencies, enforcers, public notaries, courts, police forces, are all examples of 
(costly) institutions put in place by society to help avoid the risk of default on such promises. 
Setting up such institutions is costly, and they are second-best solutions at best, as social 
welfare would be larger if there were no defaults. 
Our aim is to understand the causes and consequences of institutions chosen by individuals 
and societies to protect themselves against opportunistic behaviors of others. We focus on 
whether lack of trustworthiness affects the choice of these institutions. Institutions are costly 
for society and provide insurance against default. Due to its costs, setting up a higher level 
of institutions implies a lower social welfare overall. We pay special attention to the role of 
mechanisms, private or social, adopted to choose such institutions. Keeping this goal in mind, 
we set up institutions that can be purchased or voted upon. In terms of consequences, we 
focus on the impact of the presence of institutions on individual pro-sociality. 
There is already some research on the relation between trust and regulation which we 
discuss in the literature review. But the likely co-determination of trust and regulation implies 
that there are serious difficulties in clearly establishing causality with field data. Further, pro-
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social motives may be an important determinant of trust and consequently institutions, and 
those motives are hard to measure in the field. It is for this reason that we turn to experiments.  
We conduct a large-scale online experiment using M-Turk. The first part of the experiment 
involves a modified version of the standard trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) 
which is used to determine the level of trust and trustworthiness of participants. Given their 
decisions, individuals, are then subsequently allocated to a low-, or high-, trustworthiness 
group. In the second part, individuals get to choose between various levels of insurance which 
protect them against future opportunistic behavior. Insurance is costly and ensures that at 
least some of the money sent will be returned to the sender. Higher levels of insurance, i.e. 
higher guaranteed returned amounts, are costlier. The cost of higher insurance is reflected in 
the reduced rents from exchange, thus decreasing the returns from investment. 
Keeping the first part the same, we introduce two treatment variations in the second part 
which allows us to study different mechanisms used to build institutions. In the first, the 
purchase treatment, senders individually decide amongst four possible insurance levels (with 
‘no insurance’ also being one of the options). In the second, the voting treatment, all players 
in the group vote for their preferred insurance level. The most voted insurance level is then 
implemented for the group.  The two treatments are designed to mimic the role of (costly) 
(insurance) institutions as a substitute for trust, and to study their subsequent impact on 
trustworthiness. 
We now briefly summarize the main results. First, there is a significant demand for 
insurance in both treatments and this depends on the level of trustworthiness of the group 
(known by the individuals). When purchased, individuals in the low trustworthiness group 
demand more insurance than those in the high trustworthiness group. When voted upon, the 
demand for insurance is the same in both groups. This is quite an intriguing result that is 
explained by strategic behavior on behalf of the (low trustworthiness) individuals. This 
difference is explained by the manner in which institution levels are chosen. In the purchase 
treatment the institution (level) is chosen by the sender, whereas in the voting treatment both 
senders and receivers vote for the level of the institution. This is important, as voting upon 
an institution can have its consequences in that untrustworthy individuals can vote 
strategically to take advantage of future interactions by voting for a low level of insurance. 
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We conduct an additional treatment where only senders can vote for the level of institutions. 
In this treatment, senders in the low trustworthiness groups vote for higher levels of 
institutions which supports the hypothesis of strategic voting. 
Second, for the same levels of trustworthiness the behavior of receivers is similar across 
treatments. Those in the low trustworthiness group increase the amount returned as the level 
of institutions increases (i.e. greater insurance). This result seems to be driven by the higher 
minima imposed by the insurance contracts. However, those in the high trustworthiness 
group return less as the level (of institutions) increases, showing that the presence of 
institutions in high trustworthiness settings crowds out reciprocity.  
Finally, we find that the level of trustworthiness in the first part of the experiment is higher 
than in the second. This suggests that the mere possibility of choosing/voting for institutions 
can crowd out civic behavior. However, this result could be due to several changes between 
the first and the second parts of the experiment. First, in the second part the participants are 
assigned and then informed about the group to which they belong. Second, insurance options 
are introduced after individuals have made their decisions in the first part of the experiment. 
Third, the level of insurance in the second part is chosen/voted by other players. In order to 
analyze which of these three reasons explain the results, we conduct another series of 
experiments that allow us to understand which of the three mechanisms plays a role in 
determining our results. 
We introduce four additional treatments. In a first additional treatment, the players were 
divided into groups, and the receiver had the same set of choices as in the first part. The only 
innovation between the first and the second part was that participants knew whether they 
were in a high or a low-trustworthiness group. The second additional treatment introduced 
different levels of insurance, but the level was chosen by nature and not by the group 
members.  The third and fourth additional treatments were similar to the insurance contracts 
and voting treatments. However, we added the possibility for the sender not to send anything 
and avoid opportunistic behavior by avoiding exposure. 
We still observe crowding out, i.e. having the possibility of choosing institutions 
significantly increases the difference in the amount returned between the first and second part 
of the experiment for the high trustworthiness group. With these additional treatments we 
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can show that the crowding out effect we observe has to do with the presence of institutions 
and is not an outcome of the fact that the institutions are chosen or voted upon. Being 
informed (that they are in the low or high trustworthiness group), also seems to affect the 
amount returned in the second part, but the effect of the ability to choose institutions is larger. 
Importantly, the presence of institutions, or the release of information about the group they 
are in, does not result in any significant difference for the low trustworthiness group. 
Results in our paper are consistent with the fact that more trustworthy societies demand 
less institutions and are more efficient (see Pinotti, 2012; Aghion, Algan, & Cahuc, 2011), 
we observe higher gains from exchange in higher trustworthiness groups than in lower 
trustworthiness ones. From a policy perspective, one important lesson is that protection 
against opportunism cannot be the exclusive remit of the public sector. Voters will be 
concerned about the times when they are the opportunists themselves. The second big 
message from this perspective is that institutions against opportunism can crowd out part of 
the civic spirit that sustains cooperation, so when initiated, they should be sufficiently robust 
so that the situation does not end up being worse than without them. 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some related 
literature. Section 3 is devoted to the experimental design. Section 4 proposes a theoretical 
framework. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
Trust has been defined in a variety of ways, but a common element (see e.g. Doney, 
Cannon, & Mullen, 1998) is the disposition of individuals (or collective decision makers) to 
be placed in a situation where others can take advantage of them, in the expectation that such 
a situation leads instead to mutual benefit. Trust is often beneficial: Knack and Keefer (1997) 
show a strong relationship between trust and economic growth. Trust ensures that 
investments can be protected using a set of non-legally binding agreements on a set of rules 
(see Greif, 1993 with regard to Mahgrebi traders), or the use of social networks in ancient 
Indian Ocean trade (see e.g. Ghosh, 1993; Sealand, 2013). Trust has also been positively 
associated with better public education (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 
1993; La Porta et al., 1997), the organizations of firms (Fukuyama, 1995; La Porta et al., 
1997; Bertrand & Schoar, 2006), the labor market (Algan & Cahuc, 2009, Aghion et al., 
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2011), public service (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993), regulation (Aghion et al., 2011), 
financial outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004, 2008, 2009), insurance (Cole et al., 
2013) and research and development (Akcomak & ter Weel, 2009). 
After the correlational work of Knack & Keefer (1997), a growing literature has analyzed 
the causality path between trust and economic growth. For example, Tabellini (2010) 
analyzes the effect of culture on economic performance using regional data from 8 European 
countries. Culture is measured by individual values and beliefs such as trust, respect for 
others or confidence in the link between effort and economic success. To avoid reverse 
causality, Tabellini (2010) uses past literacy rates and restraints on executive power as 
instruments for contemporaneous trust. He finds that regions with higher levels of trust 
present significantly higher income per capita and higher growth rates. Algan & Cahuc 
(2010) follow a different strategy. They use a time-varying instruments for contemporaneous 
trust: inherited trust of immigrants. In order to exclude reverse causality, they use the trust of 
immigrants inherited from their home countries as a proxy for contemporaneous trust, 
assuming that their level of trust is gradually modified by their country of residence. They 
find a substantial impact of inherited trust on changes in income per capita.  
Two closely related papers are Aghion et al. (2010) and Pinotti (2012). Aghion et al. 
(2011) propose a theoretical model where they show that lack of trust increases the demand 
for regulation. They also provide correlational survey evidence linking trust levels in various 
countries with support for regulation. Using data from several countries, Pinotti (2012) 
argues that differences in regulation reflects concern for market failures and shows that the 
variation in entry regulations around the world mostly reflect demand pressures from 
individuals at large, as captured by differences in trust. We add to this literature by providing 
controlled experiments where causality can be more tightly established. And, more 
importantly, we add by showing that the method by which the demand is expressed, 
individual, or collective through voting, can lead to different amounts of insurance. 
Although we focus on the relationship from culture to the demand for institutions1, Lowes 
et al. (2017) offer evidence of the other direction of causality: centralized formal institutions 
                                                          
1 Alesina & Giuliano (2015) survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between culture 
and institutions. 
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are associated with weaker norms of rule-following and a greater propensity to cheat for 
material gain. This could be connected to our result that the mere existence of insurance 
against opportunism decreases the trustworthiness of the more trustworthy individuals. 
Bénabou & Tirole (2006) theoretically, and Cárdenas, Stranlund, & Willis (2000), Falk & 
Kosfeld (2006) experimentally, pioneered the study of how incentives may crowd out 
prosocial behaviour. They find that the participants behave more selfishly when the principal 
becomes more controlling. Bohnet & Beytelman (2007) find that control affects trust but not 
trustworthiness. In contrast, we find that the existence of institutions, even if they do not 
constrain participants, is enough to affect trustworthiness. We also contribute to this literature 
by adding that the level of trust in the environment matters for the crowding out. 
3. Experimental Design 
3.1 The game 
The experiments were run on M-Turk. The experimental design consisted of two parts. 
Our design is motivated by our research question, i.e. the impact of trust and trustworthiness 
on the choice of institutions. In the first, subjects participated in a variation of the trust game 
(Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) where player A had to decide whether to invest her entire 
initial endowment of 100 points or not. If she chose to invest, the endowment was tripled to 
300. The other player, B, decided how to split the 300 points received from player A. She 
could choose to return any integer amount between 0 and 300 and keep the rest for herself 
(in addition to her initial endowment). We used the strategy method (Selten, 1967) and asked 
subjects to make decisions on both roles simultaneously. A binary decision for player A was 
chosen to simplify the decision problem and obtain a unique measure of trustworthiness.  
In the second part, individuals were classified according to their level of trustworthiness 
in the first part, i.e., the amount they (as Player B) returned to player A in the first part of the 
game. Individuals who returned 150 points2 or more in the first part of the experiment were 
classified as having high trustworthiness, whereas individuals who returned less than 150 
points were classified as having low trustworthiness. Individuals in each category were then 
                                                          
2 The average amount returned in the first part was 155, very close to 150. 
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randomly matched in groups of four and were informed whether they were in a low or high 
trustworthiness group. All participants were also informed about the selection criteria. 
In the second part, subjects then made decisions in another variation of the trust game (see 
Table 1) where Player S had to select amongst four different investment options (S1, S2, S3 
and S4). Each option guaranteed (different levels of) a minimum amount returned by player 
R. We interpret these investment options as a choice between different levels of institutions. 
For example, S1 represented the lowest level of institutions, where Player R would have the 
option to return to Player S anything between 0 and 300. The lowest level of institutions 
provided no insurance. While, S4 represents a situation in which Player S has the maximum 
coverage (as her earnings are between 100 and 150) and hence provided the highest level of 
insurance. Note that, higher levels of insurance (moving from S1 to S4) imply lower overall 
theoretical surplus. For example, S1 (or no insurance) generated 300 points to be distributed 
by player R, whereas S4 generated only 150 points. This game can be interpreted as a 
standard trust game in which the sender’s investment is reduced by the cost of the insurance.  
Lower overall surplus at higher levels of insurance reflects the costs for setting up such 
institutions. 
Table 1. Trust game in Part II. 
Players’ decision Payoffs 
Player S: 
selected option: 
Player R: amount 
allocated to player S: 
Player S’s payoff Player R’s payoff 
S1 𝑋 ∈ [0,300] X 400 – X 
S2 𝑋 ∈ [25,270] X 370 – X 
S3 𝑋 ∈ [65,210] X 310 – X 
S4 𝑋 ∈ [100,150] X 250 – X 
3.2 Treatments 
We conducted three main treatments, Purchase (n=214), All-Voting (n=207), and S-Voting 
(n=320), in which we modified how the different institutions (S1 to S4) were selected. All 
experimental procedures were approved by the ethics committee at Middlesex University. 
We describe the three main treatments below. 
Purchase treatment. In this treatment, player S chose from one of the four possible levels, 
S1 to S4, of institutions. 
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All-Voting treatment. In this treatment, players first had to vote in groups of four regarding 
the institution level they preferred. In particular, subjects were presented with all possible 
pairs of insurance levels in random order and had to decide which one they preferred for each 
pair. 
S-Voting treatment. This treatment is identical to the All-Voting treatment except that only 
the vote of players S would count for choosing the insurance level. In order to be able to 
compare the results with the voting treatment, we formed groups of 8 subjects in which 4 of 
them would be randomly selected as players S and the remaining four players would be 
players R. 
Clearly, the All-Voting treatment is more realistic than the S-Voting one. As we will see, 
there is a significant difference in demand for insurance between Purchase and All-Voting. 
We conjectured that the main reason is that participants in All-Voting anticipate that they 
will be Receivers (player R) with 50% probability and will be negatively affected by the 
protection. Hence, we introduced S-Voting as an artificial treatment that allows to directly 
test the conjecture that being both senders and receivers reduces the demand for insurance. 
In the voting treatments, we used an extension of Condorcet’s voting rule proposed by 
(Young, 1986, 1988, 1995; Young & Levenglick, 1978) to select the most preferred insurance 
level in each group. This mechanism has been shown to be incentive-compatible and difficult 
to manipulate (Harrison & McDaniel, 2008).3  
We also conducted a series of additional treatments which allowed us to better analyze 
subject behavior, the mechanisms behind our results, and to disentangle possible confounds.  
No Investment+Purchase treatment (NI+Purchase). In this treatment player S had the 
option “not to invest” or select one of the four insurance levels (S1, S2, S3, S4). The “not to 
invest” option guaranteed 100 points to both players S and R. 
No investment+S-Voting treatment (NI+S-Voting). In this treatment player S had the 
option whether to invest under the insurance levels (S1, S2, S3, S4) voted by the group or to 
                                                          
3 Harrison & McDaniel (2008) argue that (sic) “it is a natural and intuitive extension of the idea of simple 
majority rule, to allow for the possibility of Condorcet cycles forming. These cycles are avoided by searching 
over all non-cyclic group rankings to find the one receiving greatest support in terms of pairwise 
comparisons.” They refer to this as the ‘Condorcet-Consistent’ voting rule. 
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opt out, i.e. “not to invest”. The decision whether to invest or not was presented after the 
voting decision. 
Repeated trust treatment (Repeated). In this treatment, player S had only two options, 
either insurance level S1 or “not to invest”.  
Random insurance level treatment (Random). In this treatment, player S had the option 
“not to invest”. If she did not choose this option then one insurance level from (S1, S2, S3, 
S4) was randomly chosen by the computer. 
All these treatments only differ from the previous treatments in one dimension of the 
second part of the modified trust game. The NI+Purchase and NI+S-Voting treatments are 
identical to the Purchase and S-Voting treatments except that they include the No Investment 
option which allows Player S to opt out and not invest in the second part of the game. Under 
this option both players S and R obtain 100 points. Note that, “not to invest” is dominated by 
S4 which guarantees 100 points to both players and 50 additional points to be distributed by 
player R. The Random treatment has the same levels of institutions as the NI+Purchase 
treatment, the only difference being that the one implemented is determined by a random 
computer draw. In the Repeated treatment, the first, and second part, subgames are identical. 
The only difference is that in the second part participants know that they belong to high or 
low trustworthiness groups and are matched with somebody in their own group. 
3.3 Procedures 
We conducted our experiments on the Amazon Mechanical Turk online platform.  A total 
of 1564 subjects (52% female; Age, M=38.46, SD=11.61) participated and the task took 
approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
Subjects were informed that the experiment would consist of a series of decision tasks 
divided into three parts and that their earnings in each part would be determined separately. 
The first two parts corresponded to the trust game described in section 3.1. In the third part 
of the experiment, subjects undertook a series of tasks measuring their risk attitudes a la Holt 
& Laury (2002), distributional social preferences (Bartling et al., 2009; Corgnet, Espín, & 
Hernán-González, 2015), numeracy (Schwartz et al., 1997; Cokely et al., 2012), cognitive 
reflection test (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014) and some socio-
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demographic. Instructions (see Appendix A) were distributed at the beginning of each part 
describing only the task in that part. No feedback was provided at any time during the 
experiment. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by treatments and balance tests. 
Treatment Female Age 
Attended 
college 
Finished 
College 
Purchase (n=214) 56.54% 38.42 79.91% 52.34% 
 (49.69%) (11.61) (40.16%) (50.06%) 
S-Voting (n=320) 45.94% 37.33 81.88% 50.94% 
 (49.91%) (11.77) (38.58%) (50.07%) 
All-Voting (n=207) 48.31% 37.98 79.23% 52.17% 
 (50.09%) (11.76) (40.67%) (50.07%) 
Repeated (n=200) 51.50% 39.06 84.00% 55.50% 
 (50.10%) (11.21) (36.75%) (49.82%) 
NI+Random (n=204) 53.43% 39.37 90.69% 64.22% 
 (50.00%) (11.81) (29.13%) (48.05%) 
NI+Purchase (n=208) 51.92% 39.32 82.21% 56.25% 
 (50.08%) (11.70) (38.33%) (49.73%) 
NI+Voting (n=211) 59.72% 38.44 86.73% 58.77% 
 (49.16%) (11.29) (34.01%) (49.34%) 
Total (n=1564) 52.05% 38.47 83.38% 55.37% 
 (49.97%) (11.61) (37.24%) (49.73%) 
     
Balance tests: joint test of orthogonality (p-values, using the variables above) 
Purchase vs. All-Voting 0.1295   
Purchase vs. S-Voting 0.5524   
NI+Purchase vs. NI+S-Voting 0.2275   
NI+Purchase vs. Random 0.9724   
NI+Purchase vs. Repeated 0.3780   
Note: the mean is reported and the standard deviation between parentheses. 
In approximately 20 minutes, subject payment varies between a minimum of $0.01 and a 
maximum of $8.87, and on average subjects earned $2.43 plus a fixed payment of $0.90. 
Earnings were presented in points and converted to dollars according to the exchange rate of 
100 points = $1. At the end of the experiment, subjects were randomly matched and assigned 
roles that determined their payments. 
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In Table 2 we show summary statistics by treatment for baseline characteristics we elicited 
prior to the online experiment. Balance tests using a join test of orthogonality on all these 
baseline characteristics also indicate that assignment to different treatments can be 
considered random. 
4. A model to rationalize choices in the experiment 
We now construct a model to organize our conjectures about choices in the experiment. 
From previous existing data of behaviors in trust games, the model should account for the 
fact that a majority of individuals return money as receivers, so they need to have 
distributional preferences. In addition, the model needs to be able to accommodate the fact 
that in two identical situations from material and distributive points of view (Part 1 of the 
experiment vs. Part 2: with level of insurance 1), receivers could behave differently. One 
model that can accommodate both needs is the one in Charness & Rabin (2002). Denoting 𝑥𝑖 
the monetary payoff of individual i, her utility 𝑣𝑖 can be written as, 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 − (𝛼𝑖 − 𝜃𝑖𝜙𝑗) 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖, 0} − (𝛽𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝜙𝑗) 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗 , 0} 
In this model, the parameter 𝛼𝑖 is the baseline sensitivity of i towards j if she has higher 
payoff than herself. 𝛽𝑖 is the baseline sensitivity of i towards j if she has lower payoff than 
herself. Then, 𝜃𝑖𝜙𝑗 modifies the baseline taking into account the attitude of i towards j based 
on j`s actions, which is why this is important in our experiment. We have that 𝜙𝑗 = −1 if 𝑗 
“misbehaved”, and 𝜙𝑗 = 1, if she did not. That is, if player 𝑗 “misbehaved”, player 𝑖 increases 
her “envy” parameter 𝛼 (or decreases her “guilt” parameter 𝛽) by a number equal to 𝜃. In 
other words, both envy and guilt are modulated (softened or increased) as a function of how 
the “other” behaved previously. 
We use risk neutral preferences, since in many trust games risk aversion seems to make 
no difference in choices (Eckel & Wilson, 2004). This is important because it means we will 
attribute the differences in choices only to beliefs and heterogeneity in β𝑖, θ𝑖, 𝜙𝑗 . 
Sender behavior 
To rationalize the choice of senders, we will not resort to social preferences, as it will 
make the analysis unnecessarily complicated and is not really needed. In the case of senders, 
the key determinant for their choices is to know how expectations will change under the 
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different treatments/environments. The optimal choice of contract in this case is the one 
yielding highest expected monetary payoff. Formally, denoting by 𝑆𝑖
∗ the optimal contract 
choice of player i belonging to group 𝐺𝑖, where 𝐺𝐿 is the low trustworthiness group and 𝐺𝐻 
is the high trustworthiness group. 
𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗∈1,2,3,4𝐸(𝑥|𝑠𝑗 , 𝐺𝑖) 
We hypothesize that 
Assumption 1. 
𝐸(𝑥|𝑠1, 𝐺𝐿) − 𝐸(𝑥|𝑠4, 𝐺𝐿) <  𝐸(𝑥|𝑠1, 𝐺𝐻) − 𝐸(𝑥|𝑠4, 𝐺𝐻) 
that is, senders expect lower payoff difference without protection relative to full protection 
in group L than in group H. Of course, with heterogeneous beliefs between individuals it can 
still be that payoff is expected to be larger under 𝑠1 or 𝑠4. Nevertheless, from assumption 1 
it is immediate that: 
Observation 1. 
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝑠1|𝐺𝐿) < 𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝑠1|𝐺𝐻), 
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝑠4|𝐺𝐿) > 𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝑠4|𝐺𝐻) 
that is, the fraction of senders choosing institution 𝑠1 will be lower in 𝐺𝐿than in 𝐺𝐻, and the 
opposite is true for s4. From Table 1, adding the payoff of sender and receiver, one can see 
that the surplus of the pair is always lower from higher level of institutions. From Observation 
1 for every sender-receiver couple i, j we can then immediately obtain the following 
observation:  
Observation 2. 
𝐸(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗|𝐺𝐿) < 𝐸(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗|𝐺𝐻) 
that is, 𝐺𝐻 groups choose on average lower levels of institutions and that is automatically 
associated with a higher aggregate payoff for the pair. 
Receiver behavior 
Receivers have no uncertainty about the action taken by senders, so the only determinant 
of their choices is their social preferences and their beliefs about what is the socially 
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appropriate action. We expect, from behavior in previous trust games, that very few senders 
will get a higher material payoff than receivers (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), so that the part of 
the function related to 𝛼𝑖  (spite) will not be important for the results. In addition, it is 
immediate from our assumption about the utility function of participants that: 
Observation 3. 
For given values of 𝜃𝑖 and 𝜙𝑗, the level of 𝑥𝑖 returned by player j is increasing in 𝛽𝑖 That 
is, individuals with a higher level of compassion return more and variations in the level of 
spite are not relevant for the results. 
However, it is more difficult to establish the effect on receivers of the existence of 
contracts. In order to see this, if we denote by 𝑥𝑖 the amount returned by the receiver, we first 
observe: 
Observation 4. 
𝐸(𝑥𝑖|𝑠1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑥𝑖|𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡1) implies that 𝜃𝑖 ≠ 0 
This is true since for the receiver the two situations (𝑠1and 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡1) are equivalent from 
the point of view of material and distributional preferences. That is, for a given 𝑥𝑖, the 
outcome in terms of the amount of money she obtains and the sender obtains are the same 
for 𝑠1and for 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡1, so if θ𝑖 were equal to zero, she should make the same choice in both 
situations, and thus it must be that θ𝑖 ≠ 0. But going beyond this observation is hard, as the 
amount returned will depend on whether and how the presence of insurance changes 𝜃𝑖. 
Nevertheless, the following observation provides some guidance about what to expect. 
Observation 5. 
If the presence of insurance increases 𝜃𝑖 (say because it signals a social norm to return), 
then 𝐸(𝑥𝑖|𝑠1) < 𝐸(𝑥𝑖|𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡1). If the presence of insurance decreases 𝜃𝑖 (say because it 
allows for a dilution of responsibility), then 𝐸(𝑥𝑖|𝑠1) > 𝐸(𝑥𝑖|𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡1). 
5. Results 
5.1  First part: Is there a need for institutions? 
We report the decisions of individuals A (trust) and B (trustworthiness) in the first part of 
the experiment in Table 2. We observe that around 50% of them decided to trust their initial 
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endowment to A. Pairwise comparisons using proportion tests show that A’s behavior in this 
part is similar across all treatments (Purchase vs All-Voting, p=0.2116; Purchase vs S-
Voting, p=0.8324; All-Voting vs S-Voting, p=0.1157).4 More importantly for our analysis, 
the behavior of B´s is also not different across treatments (Mann-Whitney-Wilcox test, 
MWW hereafter; p=0.8587, p=0.8591, p=0.9921). 
Table 3. Trust and Trustworthiness in Part 1. 
  Purchase All-Voting S-Voting 
Trust % choose A1 50.93% 57.00% 50.00% 
Trustworthiness Average 155.62 153.92 155.20 
 Median 200.00 200.00 200.00 
 Std. Dev. 70.17 72.86 71.71 
 N 214 207 320 
We get a clear separation between the low-, and high-, trustworthiness groups. The 
average amount returned in the low-trustworthiness group (M=47.88, SD=49.35) was 
significantly lower than in the high-trust-worthiness group (M=193.74, SD=20.53; MMW 
p<0.0001; pairwise comparisons all p’s<0.0001). Interestingly, trust is also lower in the low- 
(21.32%), than the high, -trustworthiness group (63.42%; proportion test, p<0.0001). This 
clearly shows that across all treatments those exhibiting high trustworthiness also display 
higher levels of trust relative to low trustworthiness individuals. 
In the low trustworthiness group, nearly 60% of the subjects make the trustor worse off 
by returning less than 100, while nearly 48% returned zero. By construction, subjects in the 
high trustworthiness group returned more than 150 points (79.6% of those in the high 
trustworthiness returned exactly 200) and consequently trustors associated with them were 
always better off. 
5.2. Second part: Institutions. 
In the second part participants decide on the level of institutions they prefer. They could 
either directly purchase the level of institutions or vote upon it. Our choice of the institutions 
(Table 1) is based on the idea that putting them in place is second best from the welfare 
standpoint. Setting up institutions is costly and the greater is the insurance provided, the 
higher is the cost of setting them up. This is reflected in the decrease in total surplus as the 
                                                          
4 Using Bonferroni’s correction, the p-value threshold for significance at the 10% (5%) level is equal to 
0.0333 (0.01667), in case we consider the 3 pairwise comparisons as independent tests.  
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minimum guaranteed amount returned to the trustor increases (from 0 for S1 to 100 for S4). 
In fact, total available surplus is maximized (=300) with S1 that provides zero insurance to 
the trustor and decreases subsequently as the level of the insurance for the trustor (sender) 
increases with a total available surplus of 250 for S4. S1, in effect captures informal social 
contracts that are at the very heart of trust dealings. While, higher levels of institutions, from 
S2 to S4, reflect the price one pays for securing institutions that provide insurance. That is, 
the higher the security, the greater is the cost to society. While, S1 shows full trust towards 
the receiver (and zero institutions per se), S4 exhibits minimal trust and 100% security for 
the trustor. 
5.2.1. Purchase treatment: S chooses the level of institutions 
In the purchase treatment, all S´s select the level of the institution they desire by choosing 
from one of the four possible insurance levels. In order to analyze the demand for institutions 
we restrict the sample to the purchase treatment and analyze how the choice of institutions 
varies according to whether individuals are in a high or a low trustworthiness group. 
Figure 1. Choice of Institutions (Purchase treatment) 
 
As the cost of insurance increases with the level of institutions, the expected earnings of 
individuals in the high trustworthiness group are higher than for those individuals in the low 
trustworthiness one. This is also consistent with Observation 2 in our theoretical framework. 
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5.2.2   Voting treatment: Player S votes for the level of institutions 
Figure 1 shows that the majority of individuals (57.96%) in the high trustworthiness group 
demand the lowest level of institution S1 (i.e. least insurance). Meanwhile, in the low 
trustworthiness group, the lowest level of institution (S1) is demanded by 40.35%, with 
33.33% choosing the maximum level of insurance (S4). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and a 
Fisher exact test show that the distributions by group are different (p=0.0636 and p=0.0315, 
respectively). Thus, individuals’ level of trustworthiness seems to affect the choice of 
institutions, with low trustworthiness individuals being more likely to choose a higher level 
of institutions (resulting in higher insurance). This is consistent with our theoretical 
Observation 1 in Section 4. 
In the purchase treatment, institutions are chosen by individuals by paying a price for 
increased levels of insurance. While a price may be implicit in the choice of institutions in 
certain situations, institutions are also voted for by citizens (or selected by elected politicians, 
who are supposed to represent electoral preferences). 
We ran two treatments here, the S-Voting and All-Voting treatments. In the S-Voting 
treatment only players S could vote for the institution while in All-Voting both players S and 
R voted. Players in both treatments were presented with all possible pairs of insurance levels 
in random order and had to decide which one they preferred for each pair. Then we apply the 
Condorcet’s voting rule proposed (Young, 1986, 1988, 1995; Young & Levenglick, 1978) to 
select the institution for each group. 
First, we analyze the results from the S-Voting treatment, where players S vote in groups 
of 4 for the level of institutions they prefer. Out of the times they are presented with a 
particular choice we compute the fraction of times subjects vote for institutions S1, S2, S3, 
and S4 in pairwise comparisons. We then analyze differences across groups for these 
proportions. Results are reported in Table 4 (first three columns). We find that the fraction 
of times those in the high trustworthiness group vote for the lowest level of institution (S1) 
is significantly higher than that for the low trustworthiness group (proportion test, p=0.0016). 
The opposite is true for the highest level of institutions (S4) that provides most insurance 
(p=0.0001). This is qualitatively similar to what we observe in Figure 1 and also is consistent 
with our theoretical Observations 1 and 2 in Section 4. 
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Now we analyze results from the All-Voting treatment (Table 4, last three columns) where 
individuals vote in groups of 4 before knowing if they will be participating as senders or 
receivers. Our motivation for running this treatment is to see whether strategic voting is 
observed when one can vote without knowing what role, player R or S, they will be in later 
on. Results show that there are no differences across groups, and both groups prefer 
institutions S1. We observe that the fraction of votes received declines as the level of 
institutions increases. This is not consistent with our theoretical Observation 1 in Section 4. 
We analyze this unexpected result in the following section. 
Table 4. Fraction of time subjects voted for one option (with respect to another one) by 
High and Low trustworthiness groups. 
Mean 
(std dev) 
S-Voting All-Voting 
Level of 
institutions 
High Low p+ High Low p+ 
S1 
0.569 
(0.424) 
0.397 
(0.428) 
0.0016 
0.724 
(0.407) 
0.780 
(0. 388) 
0.3768 
S2 
0.571 
(0.248) 
0.520 
(0.245) 
0.1071 
0.578 
(0.217) 
0.613 
(0.177) 
0.2845 
S3 
0.499 
(0.256) 
0.516 
(0.216) 
0.5813 
0.442 
(0.202) 
0.393 
(0.169) 
0.1102 
S4 
0.362 
(0.406) 
0.567 
(0.429) 
0.0001 
0.256 
(0.395) 
0.214 
(0.378) 
0.4951 
+ This column corresponds to the p-values of a t-test comparing the High and Low trustworthiness groups. 
5.2.3.   Comparison across the three treatments: 
Here we compare the choice of institutions between individuals across the three 
treatments. We create a dummy variable for high insurance which takes value one if S3 or 
S4 are selected, and zero otherwise, in the purchase treatment. In the treatments where players 
S vote for the level of institutions, the high insurance variable takes value one if options S3 
or S4 are always selected by the individuals when presented in pairs against another option. 
Therefore, this dummy indicates whether the individual strongly prefer institutions S3 or S4, 
i.e. a fairly high level of insurance.  
In Table 5 we run a linear probability model5 with the high insurance dummy as a 
dependent variable. In the first two columns we see that the treatments where players S chose 
                                                          
5 Results from a probit regression are very similar and available on request. 
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the level of institutions, or voted for it, are very similar and subjects remain equally likely to 
demand high institutions (after controlling for individual demographics, risk aversion, envy, 
CRT and numeracy tests, etc.). In contrast, when players vote for the level of institutions, 
and this also affects them as player R, they select lower levels of institutions. When we divide 
the sample into the low and high trustworthiness groups, we see that these differences come 
from those who returned less and are also robust to the inclusion of all these controls. This 
shows that low trustworthiness individuals are more likely to vote strategically. 
Table 5. Linear regressions on the choice of high insurance (S3 or S4 vs S1 or S2) 
 All individuals High trustworthiness group Low trustworthiness group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.3598*** 
(0.0329) 
0.4627*** 
(0.1384) 
0.3057*** 
(0.0369) 
0.5218*** 
(0.1776) 
0.5088*** 
(0.0668) 
0.2651    
(0.2822)    
S-Voting 0.0572 
(0.0455) 
0.0328 
(0.0475) 
0.0446 
(0.0515) 
-0.0066 
(0.0540) 
0.0769 
(0.0894) 
0.1303    
(0.0957)    
All-Voting -0.1303*** 
(0.0453) 
-0.1078** 
(0.0472) 
-0.0557 
(0.0528) 
-0.0428 
(0.0544) 
-0.3323*** 
(0.0858) 
-0.2376*** 
(0.0885)    
Risk aversion  
 
-0.0014 
(0.0095) 
 
 
0.0001 
(0.0114) 
 
 
-0.0098    
(0.0181)    
Envy  
 
0.0791*** 
(0.0201) 
 
 
0.0756*** 
(0.0220) 
 
 
0.0612    
(0.0517)    
Compassion  
 
-0.0731*** 
(0.0214) 
 
 
-0.0808*** 
(0.0276) 
 
 
-0.0294    
(0.0528)    
CRT  
 
0.0173 
(0.0123) 
 
 
0.0152 
(0.0138) 
 
 
0.0190    
(0.0271)    
Numeracy  
 
-0.0166 
(0.0153) 
 
 
-0.0416** 
(0.0179) 
 
 
0.0477    
(0.0307)    
Female  
 
0.0067 
(0.0393) 
 
 
-0.0209 
(0.0450) 
 
 
0.1349    
(0.0819)    
Age  
 
-0.0008 
(0.0017) 
 
 
0.0001 
(0.0019) 
 
 
-0.0037    
(0.0035)    
Attended college  
 
0.0197 
(0.0599) 
 
 
0.0194 
(0.0696) 
 
 
0.0045    
(0.1246)    
Finished college  
 
-0.0291 
(0.0446) 
 
 
-0.0529 
(0.0519) 
 
 
0.0826    
(0.0885)    
Trust unknown individuals  
 
0.0041 
(0.0194) 
 
 
-0.0011 
(0.0226) 
 
 
0.0451    
(0.0380)    
Expected trustworthiness 
(first part) 
 
 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
 
 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
 
 
-0.0005    
(0.0010)    
Sent in the first part  
 
-0.2034*** 
(0.0449) 
 
 
-0.1607*** 
(0.0545) 
 
 
-0.3686*** 
(0.0784)    
Observations 644 564 466 409 178 155    
R2 0.0259 0.1440 0.0077 0.1304 0.1205 0.2701    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
As predicted in Observation 1, we find that in the high trustworthiness group most 
individuals choose S1. Meanwhile, for the low trustworthiness group there is a sizeable 
percentage of individuals choosing S4. However, many still choose S1. The differences 
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observed in the All-Voting treatment may, however, be due to players’ strategic behavior. In 
this case, players voted for the level of institutions without knowing what role, S or R, they 
will be playing later on. From the point of view of player R, S1 is always preferable, given 
that it will maximize payments if they decide to return nothing (or a small amount). From the 
point of view of player S, their choice may be different depending on what group they are in. 
For the high trustworthiness group, players S would maximize payments choosing S1 if they 
expect the other players in their group would return, as in part 1, an amount equal to or higher 
than 150. However, players S in the low trustworthiness group would choose S4 if they 
expect the other players in their group to return less than 150, as in part 1. This could explain 
why the level of institutions chosen by the low trustworthiness group differs across 
treatments. 
5.3.  Return Behavior. 
Does return behavior change between the purchase and the voting treatments? Here we 
analyze this by level of institutions and group. Figure 2 shows the average payments for 
players S and R in the first and second part of the experiment by treatment and group. First, 
we find that the average pattern is practically identical across treatments (there are only minor 
differences among panels a), b), and c) in Figure 2). Second, we observe that the total amount 
of payments decreases with the level of institutions, as implemented in the experimental 
design (400 for S1, 370 for S2, 310 for S3, and 250 for S4). Third, we find strong differences 
in how the rents are distributed between player S and R, depending on which group they are 
in. In the high trustworthiness group, players S get around 43.2% (between 39.7% and 47.7%) 
of the rents generated, whereas in the low trustworthiness group, player S obtain only 24.0% 
(between 12.1% and 42.4%) of the rents. Interestingly, the effect of institutions also differs 
between groups. In the high trustworthiness group, players S’ earnings decrease with the 
level of institutions. This result seems consistent with the results of Falk & Kosfeld (2006) if 
players R perceive higher institutions as a signal of distrust. However, in our setting the total 
rents decrease with the level of institutions but the relative amount sent back by recipients 
remained stable across the different levels of institutions, as mentioned above. In the low 
trustworthiness group, the pattern is the opposite. Players S’ earnings, increase with the level 
of institutions. This is the case as players R are forced to increase the amount returned with 
the higher minima determined by each level of insurance. In the low trustworthiness group, 
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51.27% (51.78%) [57.87%] {70.56%} returned the minimum amount of 0 (25) [65] {100} 
under S1 (S2) [S3] {S4}, whereas these proportions were significantly lower in the high 
trustworthiness group 2.94% (2.94%) [3.68%] {25.00%} (proportion tests, all p’s<0.0001). 
Figure 2: Payments by Treatment and Group 
a) Purchase 
 
b) All-Voting 
 
c) S-Voting 
 
The regression analysis reported in Table 6 confirm these results. The first four columns 
of Table 6 show that for each level of institution (S1-S4), the amount returned is significantly 
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higher in the high trustworthiness groups, whereas there are no significant differences across 
treatments. However, differences between the high and low trustworthiness groups decrease 
with the level of institutions. We also find that the main observable predictor of the amount 
returned is the level of compassion (𝛽𝑖) of the participant, consistent with the theory 
informing our Observation 3 in Section 4. 
Table 6. Linear regressions on the amount returned by level of insurance and the difference 
between amounts returned in the first and second parts (S1) of the experiment. 
 
(1) 
S1 
(2) 
S2 
(3) 
S3 
(4) 
S4 
(5) 
Part 1 – S1 
Constant -13588 
-16589 
8038 
-13004 
61.757*** 
-8610 
103.087*** 
-3562 
32.107**  
-16036 
S-Voting 4.216 
(10.519) 
0.560 
(8.188) 
-0.963 
(5.146) 
-1.126 
(1.936) 
-0.557    
(9.539) 
All-Voting 0.079 
(11.319) 
-5.215 
(8.534) 
-5.089 
(5.212) 
-0.997 
(2.050) 
1.129    
(9.272) 
High trustworthiness group 95.489*** 
(10.579) 
62.729*** 
(8.769) 
34.766*** 
(5.770) 
8.233*** 
(2.346) 
37.738*** 
(9.432) 
S-Voting x  
   High trustworthiness group 
-4.350 
(11.599) 
2.431 
(9.256) 
4.293 
(6.024) 
-0.337 
(2.418) 
-0.238    
(10.575) 
All-Voting x  
   High trustworthiness group 
-5.572 
(12.673) 
5.861 
(9.814) 
7.747 
(6.200) 
1.908 
(2.550) 
5.068    
(10.638) 
Risk aversion -1.483 
(1.025) 
-0.684 
(0.798) 
-0.405 
(0.524) 
-0.167 
(0.236) 
1.834**  
(0.880) 
Envy -0.148 
(2.127) 
-0.736 
(1.790) 
0.561 
(1.220) 
-0.315 
(0.543) 
0.964    
(2.000) 
Compassion 19.991*** 
(3.178) 
17.702*** 
(2.515) 
9.937*** 
(1.567) 
2.898*** 
(0.655) 
-14.034*** 
(2.790) 
CRT 0.043 
(1.442) 
0.235 
(1.083) 
-0.096 
(0.743) 
-0.243 
(0.325) 
-0.952    
(1.304) 
Numeracy 2.819* 
(1.693) 
2.828** 
(1.349) 
0.240 
(0.941) 
-0.333 
(0.413) 
-2.265    
(1.610) 
Female 1.518 
(4.099) 
-0.330 
(3.347) 
-1.599 
(2.222) 
-0.185 
(0.987) 
2.981    
(3.722) 
Age 0.306* 
(0.182) 
0.172 
(0.128) 
-0.002 
(0.093) 
-0.001 
(0.044) 
-0.341**  
(0.172) 
Attended college -4.344 
(6.118) 
-3.446 
(5.071) 
1.166 
(3.289) 
0.047 
(1.481) 
0.835    
(5.887) 
Finished college 3.961 
(4.360) 
1.755 
(3.584) 
-2.015 
(2.505) 
-0.872 
(1.121) 
-3.327    
(3.791) 
Trust unknown individuals 3.300 
-2140 
3.052* 
-1730 
2.136* 
-1151 
0.136 
(0.518) 
-1.044    
-1851 
Expected trustworthiness (first 
part) 
0.107* 
(0.062) 
0.060 
(0.047) 
0.024 
(0.030) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
0.013    
(0.056) 
Sent in the first part 13.371** 
-5295 
10.929** 
-4322 
4706 
-2897 
1565 
-1264 
-6981 
-4973 
Observations 637 637 637 637 637 
R2 0.6105 0.5703 0.4886 0.2496 0.1284 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 23 
In the second part, when the level of institutions is S1, there is effectively no protection 
as R can always return 0 to player S. This situation is therefore the same as the one in the 
first part of the game. This allows us to compare the stability of an individuals’ level of 
trustworthiness (see first two bars, Part 1 and S1 in Part 2, in Figure 2). In order to do this, 
we calculate the difference in the amounts returned in the first part of the game and, under 
S1 in the second part. If the difference is positive, this means that the amount returned in the 
second part is smaller than the amount returned in the first. In the last column of Table 6 we 
report the results of a regression of the difference in trustworthiness between the first and 
second part (S1).  
Overall, we do not observe differences across treatments. However, we find a significant 
positive effect for the high trustworthiness group. This implies that the introduction of 
institutions makes those in the high trustworthiness group less likely to return an amount as 
high as the one returned in the first part. Introducing the possibility of choosing institutions 
seems to crowd out civic behavior differentially for the high trustworthiness group, and this 
is robust to controlling for risk aversion and social preferences.  
Figure 3: Difference in the amount returned in the purchase and voting 
treatments between the first and second (S1) parts by group. 
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Finally, note that from the viewpoint of the receiver, the environments in Part 1 and Part 
2 under S1 are identical, in a material and distributional way. That is, for a given amount 
returned by the receiver, the outcome in terms of the amount of money she obtains and the 
sender obtains are the same in Part 1 and Part 2 under S1. Hence, from our Observation 4 in 
the theory Section 4, we know that θ𝑖 ≠ 0, meaning that players change their sense of 
“deservingness” of return behavior in the presence of institutions. The fact that there is a 
decrease means, in accordance with Observation 5 in Section 4, that the presence of 
institutions decreases 𝜃𝑖, perhaps because it allows for a dilution of responsibility. Figure 3 
shows the differences in trustworthiness between the first and second part of the experiment 
for the three treatments. One can see that those in the high trustworthiness group are more 
likely to display positive differences than those in the low trustworthiness one. A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the two distributions are different (p-value = 
0.0003). We investigate this result further in the next section. 
5.4 Crowding-Out of pro-sociality. 
In the previous section we saw that individuals in the high trustworthiness group return 
significantly less in the second, than in the first, part of the experiment. This difference arises 
even when the lowest level of institutions is chosen (where there is no protection and the 
amounts that can be returned are the same in the first and the second part). We postulate that 
this could be due to the fact that we allow the participants to select the level of institutions 
they prefer that subsequently crowds-out civic spirit. 
To understand this further, it will be useful to look at the changes in the experimental 
design between the first and second stages. This is important as we compare the level of 
trustworthiness of the individuals between these two stages to establish crowding out. We 
see that besides the introduction of institutions in the second part there are three changes that 
could possibly confound the results. The changes are as follows. First, in the second part 
senders did not have the option not to send anything (i.e. to opt out). Second, we inform 
subjects they belong to either the low or high trustworthiness group. Third, in the second part 
participants know that the level of institutions is either chosen or voted by other players. The 
result earlier mentioned could have arisen due to any one of these factors. 
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Now we explore whether any of these factors could be driving the crowding out result. 
We do this by using the additional treatments where they had the option “not to invest” in 
the second part. In order to understand whether the knowledge of being in the high 
trustworthiness group also has an additional effect on our results, we restrict our sample to 
the Repeated treatment where individuals play the same game in both parts, with the only 
difference being that in the second part they have information about the group they are in.  
Table 7. Trustworthiness by treatment for the high trustworthiness group. 
Treatment Part 1 S1 in Part 2 Difference (%) 
Paired t-test 
p-value 
Repeated 197.93 
(29.45) 
183.14 
(46.04) 
-6.78% 
(22.03%) 
0.0003 
NI+Purchase 193.53 
(23.18) 
175.99 
(50.18) 
-16.78% 
(28.82%) 
<0.0001 
NI+Voting 197.81 
(24.87) 
168.33 
(48.62) 
-9.06% 
(24.44%) 
<0.0001 
NI+Random 193.37 
(29.52) 
161.18 
(59.79) 
-13.73% 
(25.06%) 
<0.0001 
Note: the mean is reported and the standard deviation between parentheses. 
Comparing the amount returned in both parts for the high trustworthiness group (see Table 
7) we find that they return a smaller amount in the second part: 197.93 vs 183.14 (paired t-
test, p =0.0003). Thus, part of the effect observed is due to the fact that in the second part, 
individuals are informed about the group they are in. 6  In particular, we inform them whether 
members of their group returned less or more than 150. That could change what they perceive 
to be socially acceptable, or the “social norm”, and make them more likely to reduce the 
amount returned. Results are different for the low trustworthiness group, as subjects in the 
first part returned a slightly lower, but not significant amount than in the second part (45 vs. 
51, p=0.5458). When looking at the high trustworthiness group, Figure 4 shows how the 
distribution of amounts returned has a higher mass of points to the left in the second round, 
indicating the decrease in the amount returned. 
                                                          
6 Another difference between part 1 and S1 is that subjects are playing for a second time the same game which 
could generate some learning (Weber, 2003). The sequence of Parts 1 and 2, motivated by our research 
questions, may also present some order effects. These learning and order effects are, however, present in all 
the treatments analyzed in this section, so at a minimum, the presence of institutions is making a difference on 
top of them (see Table 8). 
 26 
However, knowing the group they are in may not be the whole answer. In what follows 
we compare results from this treatment to the rest to analyze the importance of the 
introduction of institutions. As we only observe the crowding out effect for the high 
trustworthiness group, we restrict our sample to this group. We then compare the treatment 
mentioned above where they play the same game in both the stages (and know their group) 
to the treatments where institutions are either chosen randomly, individually or collectively.  
Figure 4. Distribution of amounts returned in the first and second rounds, high 
trustworthiness group in the Repeated treatment. 
 
As in the previous section, the dependent variable is the difference in the amounts returned 
in the first and second parts (S1). Thus, a positive number would indicate a decrease in the 
amount returned in the second part, compared to the first. We first test whether the 
introduction of institutions further increases the crowding out effect over and above the effect 
of telling subjects the group they are in (i.e. compared with the difference observed in the 
Repeated treatment). We run regressions with a dummy called “NI+Institutions”, which takes 
value one for NI+Purchase, NI+Voting, and NI+Random treatments where higher levels of 
institutions are introduced, and value 0 for the Repeated treatment.  Results are shown in the 
first column of Table 8. 
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Table 8. Crowding out of civic spirit. Linear regressions on 
the difference between amounts returned in the first and 
second parts (S1) of the experiment. 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 61.546*** 
(17.801) 
62.154*** 
(17.790) 
NI+Institutions 11.673** 
(4.908) 
12.894**  
(5.733) 
NI+Choice 
  
-2.042    
(5.588) 
Risk aversion -0.233 
(1.218) 
-0.237    
(1.218) 
Envy 3.795* 
(2.203) 
3.731*   
(2.257) 
Compassion -15.321*** 
(3.530) 
-15.256*** 
(3.563) 
CRT 1.592 
(1.613) 
1.490    
(1.686) 
Numeracy -3.702** 
(1.533) 
-3.744**  
(1.528) 
Female -5.952 
(4.358) 
-5.952    
(4.362) 
Age -0.152 
(0.183) 
-0.153    
(0.183) 
Attended college 17.086*** 
(6.011) 
16.906*** 
(6.082) 
Finished college -7.946 
(5.487) 
-7.943    
(5.498) 
Trust unknown individuals 0.252 
(2.650) 
0.237    
(2.653) 
Expected trustworthiness 
(first part) 
-0.062 
(0.060) 
-0.062    
(0.060) 
Sent in the first part -2.104 
(4.815) 
-1.919    
(4.846) 
Observations 516 516 
R2 0.1239 0.1242 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
We find a positive and significant effect of this (difference) variable. In the second column 
we introduce another dummy called “NI+Choice” that indicates the treatments that introduce 
higher levels of institutions that are chosen, either directly (NI+Purchase) or by voting 
(NI+Voting). The “NI+Choice” dummy variable takes value one for NI+Purchase and, 
NI+Voting treatments, and value 0 for the Repeated and NI+Random treatments. We find 
that introducing institutions significantly increases the difference between the amount 
returned in the first and the second parts (𝛽(𝑁𝐼 + 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) = 11.673, 𝑝 = 0.018 ), 
and the effect is larger than the effect of telling them the group they are in, which is the 
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reference category. However, once institutions are introduced, the fact that they are chosen 
does not have a significant effect (𝛽(𝑁𝐼 + 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒) = −2.042, 𝑝 = 0.661).  
5.5. Economic cost: Low vs High Trustworthiness group. 
In this section we investigate the economic costs of being in a low trustworthiness group. 
In order to do this, we can take advantage of the fact that in the NI+Purchase treatment the 
participants had the option “Not to invest” in addition to choosing one of the four levels of 
institutions as in the Purchase treatment. Given that choosing any level of institutions can 
also increase gains for both players (see last column in Table 9), we can use this to compute 
the benefits of exchange lost due to lack of trust in this treatment.  
Table 9. Economic costs of low trustworthiness. Proportion of individuals who choose each 
level of institutions by group. 
Level of institutions 
High trustworthiness 
group 
Low trustworthiness 
group 
Total rents 
Not to invest 13.38% 29.41% 200 
S1 52.23% 31.37% 400 
S2 10.19% 5.88% 370 
S3 12.74% 7.84% 320 
S4 11.46% 25.49% 250 
N 157 51  
We find that a smaller proportion of the high trustworthiness individuals (13.38%) decided 
not to invest, while this proportion was significantly larger (29.41%) in the low 
trustworthiness group (test of proportions, p=0.0085). In Table 9 we can see the proportion 
of individuals who chose each type of institution. If we multiply each proportion by the size 
of the pie given by each type of institutions, we get that while the gains from trade in the high 
trustworthiness group are of 341.53, while in the low trustworthiness group this is 294.12.  
6. Conclusions 
The importance of institutions in exchange and governance has been long appreciated. In 
early trade it was common to see the use of endogenously developed social networks to 
enforce trust and trustworthiness in exchange (Greif, 1993; Ghosh, 1993; Sealand, 2013). 
Evidence points out that institutions can endogenously arise out of a participative process 
(mutual agreements, social networks, voting, etc..) or be imposed upon through legal dictate. 
Interestingly, how the choice of the institutions impacts future actions of the participating 
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agents is little studied. The importance of understanding this link in the design of institutions 
cannot be understated. 
In this paper we have attempted to understand the causes and consequences of institutions 
chosen by individuals given their level of trustworthiness. We also study how the demand 
for institutions depends on the level of trustworthiness and how it depends on the manner in 
which it is chosen: purchase or voting. 
We obtain several interesting new results.  We find that there is a significant demand for 
institutions and it depends on the level of trustworthiness of the group. When institutions are 
purchased or voted upon only by the senders, individuals in the low trustworthiness group 
demand higher levels of institutions than those in the high trustworthiness group. When voted 
upon by all individuals, the demand for institutions is the same in both groups. This is 
explained by the fact that low trustworthiness individuals vote strategically to take advantage 
of future interactions by voting for a low level of insurance. 
The behavior of receivers is similar across treatments and those in the low trustworthiness 
group increase the amount returned as the level of institutions increases (i.e. greater 
insurance). However, those in the high trustworthiness group return less as the level (of 
institutions) increases. We find that the level of trustworthiness in the first part of the 
experiment is higher than in the second. This is mostly explained by the introduction of 
institutions, that crowd out civic behavior. 
Our experiment is static, and in our context, institutions are a substitute for trust. In this 
way we miss a potentially important dynamic effect, where good institutions and high 
insurance can foster trust, create a social norm, and eventually become unnecessary. 
Historical research, such as Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2016), suggests that good 
institutions can enhance civic virtue in the long run. We believe that this is an important 
agenda for future experimental research in this context.  
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